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THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE IN ASIA.
The sentiment of Americans toward Russia has been for many
years that between distant friends, the strength of whose friendship
lies in the absence of conflicting interests. On the other hand, the
displeasure which has sometimes led us to lift up our eyes to heaven
and deplore the political immorality of Great Britain is occasioned
chiefly by that familiarity which, in great things, as in small, breeds
contempt. It has been the fashion in this country to condemn the
avid appetite for land developed by England, while condoning the
equally prodigious enlargement of the RussianEmpire. The popular
idea of each is, unhappily for us, prompted by an ignorance of the
real issue involved, serene enough to allow most Americans a birth-
right in the land where the adage tells us it were folly to be wise.
As a people we have been indifferent to Russian aggressions be-
cause they seemed to concern only the states of Eastern Europe
and the more benighted parts of Western and Middle Asia. The
acquisitions of Great Britain having been made in more conspic-
uous regions appear to have excited irritation wherever they are
known. The eternal principles which govern the course and con-
duct of nations, their preservation, and the benefit alike of ruler
and ruled, are obscured because of petty prejudices or the equally
petty ambitions of politicians. A sense of nearness has, however,
recently come upon us while contemplating Russia's latest move in
Eastern Asia. By passing from Siberia to China she has become
in an appreciable fashion our neighbor, with all that this implies to
our trans-Pacific trade.
Early in the present century, when Russia began her glacier-like
movement from West to East across the Asiatic continent, always
mindful of consolidating as well as conquering her territories, the
commercial enterprise of Great Britain found its way to Eastern
Asia by sea; and because the door of trade would not open the
eager merchants blew it in. The Imperial clan that have governed
China since the days of Cromwell were aroused from their fancied
security by two wars, and forced to recede a little from their be-
sotted policy of obstruction and isolation. But the lesson of these
encounters was not fully learned either by the teacher or by the
taught. England hoped, for no sufficient reason, that when her
military impotence had been clearly proven China would listen to
the voice of persuasion; and since trade, not territory or booty, was
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her object, it seemed incredible to the Anglo-Saxon that a nation
of astute traffickers like the Chinese should not understand their
best interests and reconstruct their affairs upon European models.
They did not perceive that it was the Manchu Dynasty and the
ruling class of bigoted and self-centered -literati, not the Chinese
people, with whom they had to deal. The Court of Peking, on the
other hand, when it saw the operations of the victor stayed and his
troops withdrawn, sought safety in diplomacy and endeavored to
frustrate by finesse the desires of the foreigners, which it had been
quite unable to prevent by force. So the work of Great Britain
remained incomplete, while China relapsed once more into her fan-
tastic confidence in a military and intellectual strength that had
vanished more than a century before.
Meanwhile Russia was continuing her attack, already well
begun when the Opium War occurred, by absorbing in succession
the various nomadic tribes and independent Khanates that lay upon
the western borders of the Chinese Empire. Her aims were utterly
unlike those of England. She wanted not trade, but empire. For
Russia is poor and backward, China is rich; and, man for man, the
Chinese peasant is better material for the farm, the factory, the
army, than the Russian Moujik. Like the Goth of medieval Europe,
the Slav of to-day watches from his northern fastness the rich plains
and prospect of plunder in the south. In comparison to his ambi-
tions the desires of all other European nations are as fly-bites to the
Chinese Empire. The Russian, better informed than his rivals as
to the wealth and potential strength to be secured from the master-
ship of China, eagerly anticipates his opportunity not only to coerce
and conquer, but to use and preserve.
In order to comprehend the meaning of Russia's attitude as she
stands over China now, it is necessary to review some typical inci-
dents in her past career and endeavor to secure from these an out-
line of her deliberate policy. Her aspiration toward territorial ex-
pansion was, for the first time perhaps, clearly expressed in the
reign of Peter the Great, but it was not given definite direction until
the period of Catherine II, when by following along the line of least
resistence, it found in Asia an adequate field for its fulfilment. The
problem of advancing her ambition was at that time complicated
by the Near Eastern Question, involving the dislodgment of
Turkey from territory that was legitimately Muscovite, lying about
the Black Sea. This question has had a mighty influence upon the
affairs of Europe during the century which has elapsed since
Catherine's death, but it may be dismissed here as outside the prov-
ince of our immediate inquiry, except, perhaps, for its indirect use-
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fulness to her ulterior purposes, as a blind to set before the civilized
world while she fashioned her forces for other ends. These ends she
could achieve in her own way and in her own convenient time. The
whole unoccupied northern slope of the continent was her property
by right of conquest effected in the seventeenth century, affording
at once a commanding base for operations against any part of
Middle and Eastern Asia, and a field for colonization. Russia ap-
pears to be so vast a country even to her own statesmen, however,
that the uses of Siberia as a home for her surplus population have
been until lately overlooked; but its admirable fitness for the fur-
therance and support of her expansion schemes was never neglected
or forgotten. Nature herself had secured this long line upon its
northern side, so that with his back toward an impenetrable frozen
coast the great bear could menace in safety the inhabitants of half
a continent.
The frozen swamps and tundras of the Asiatic seaboard did not,
however, satisfy her very natural desires. It was necessary in ad-
vancing these to impinge upon the territories lying south of her pos-
sessions, and thus carry the world-old conflict of East and West,
of Turanian and Aryan, at once to the remotest extremity of Asia.
The attempt, when first made, met with a decided rebuff, for during
the last century the Manchu rulers of China were capable of giving
the law to all further Asia, and when Russian adventurers tried to
occupy the fertile valley of the Amur, the Emperor at Peking com-
manded their withdrawal and the Emperor at St. Petersburg
obeyed. Such arrogance as was shown by the eastern to the west-
ern court during the intercourse of a hundred years would have
stung any sensitive nation to war. But Russia at this stage was
comforted, doubtless, by two reflections: first, nobody then knew
or cared about what happened in Northern Asia; second, she was
young and could afford to bide her-time while China was old and
sure to fail.
Meantime a task of more pressing importance awaited her nearer
home. The safety of Western Siberia, already proving its agricul-
tural richness, was gravely affected by nomadic bands which preyed
upon its southern border. To expose her flank at any place in her
long line was fatal to Russia's ultimate hopes of securing Eastern
Asia. It was therefore necessary to attack the Kirghizes, the
Usbegs, the Turkomans, and finally the little Khanates of the whole
trans-Caspian region occupying what is distinctively called Central
Asia. Russia must not only be forgiven, but praised for this work.
It was a fierce and thankless contest against savagery and the in-
tense and fanatical bigotry of Muhammadan communities that
303"
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fought with the consecrated fury of the earlier Saracen conquerors
It incidentally placed the victor in a position where-by means of a
railroad which has finally solved the problem of controlling desert
tribes-he could threaten the Indian, Persian and Turkish* empires;
but his real desires, the security of Western Siberia and the trade
routes across Central Asia to China, were amply accomplished by
the subjugation of these centers of barbarism.
Long before the successful conclusion of this preliminary labor
the moral and intellectual deterioration of the ruling house of China,
inevitable in the life of every Asiatic dynasty, had begun to exhibit'
its melancholy influence in the political and material, condition of
the empire. While Great Britain was, for purposes of her own,
making the incompetence of China apparent to all the world, Russia
pursued her secular policy of advancing her frontiers and consoli-
dating her possessions as occasions offered. This display of oppor-
tunism on an international scale involved the arts of diplomacy
rather than those of war. Territory in large or small quantities has
been in the picturesque Japanese phrase, "moth-eaten" out of the
Chinese domain during the past forty years by processes as varied
as they are ingenious-and with this especial advantage to the ag-
gressor, that while it is impossible to carry on continually military
campaigns the business of land-grabbing may be renewed with each
new sunrise. The favorite device to secure her ends hitherto has
been a demand at a moment of national embarrassment for some
district so remote as to seem comparatively unimportant to the
ignorant and listless palace clique at Peking. Such a coup was
effected in 1858, when, taking advantage of the defeat inflicted upon
China by the Allies, Russia retrieved the check received in 1689,
and, without striking a blow, obtained the Amur as the boundary
between the two empires and rights to navigate and settle on the
river. As punishment for China's refusal to carry out this agree-
ment next year-an act of bad faith which she coupled with her
fatuous efforts to prevent the passage of the Taku forts by the
British-she was compelled to surrender the whole coast region
lying east of the Usuri between the mouth of the Amur and the
boundary of Korea, an area covering eleven degrees of latitude and
containing about I7o,ooo square miles. If to this be added the pre-
vious acquisition of the territory north of the Amur, perhaps ioo,ooo
square miles in extent, the net gain to Russia of this operation is
found to embrace a country considerably larger than the State of
Texas. It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of this
double treaty to the accomplishment of Russian policy. Its signifi-
cance to their fortunes in Eastern Asia was rather greater than that
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of securing Oregon to ours in Western America. Thereby they
gained not only a magnificent waterway leading 1200 miles inland
from the sea, but a long stretch of coast at the southern extremity
of which could be placed a port and arsenal that in strength as well
as in name might typify Russia's Vladivostok or "Dominion of the
East."
Yet this performance hardly attracted the passing notice of
European publicists. Beyond a surly growl the British lion made
no comment, though he could lash himself into very genuine anger
when the wholesome business of clearing the robbers out of Turke-
stan was proceeding. The presence of a powerful neighbor beyond
the Pamirs and Hindu Kusli-the inevitable boundaries of India-.
seemed distressing; the possession by that same neighbor of the
open road to Northern China seemed insignificant. But, "on the
Amur and Usuri the boundary line does not bear the stamp of per-
manency," wrote an intelligent English traveler at the time. "Russia
holding one bank only of these rivers, whilst China holds the other,
may at any chosen moment furnish a government desirous of en-
croaching upon its neighbor with fertile causes of dispute, and when
the time comes when the huge Chinese empire tumbles to pieces,
the whole of Manchuria, with Liaotung must become the prey oi
Russia."* England was not without its prophet, though the
prophet, as usual, was without honor in his own country.
Another attempt on the part of Russia to absorb a distant fron-
tier of China while the central government was powerless to inter-
fere, had a different ending, and is also interesting as an illustration
of Russia's willingness to withdraw rather than fight when the time
seems inopportune or premature. A rebellion which broke out in
the province of Ili, in the far west of the empire, was successful in
destroying Chinese authority there and establishing in its place an
old-fashioned type of Asiatic anarchy. Danger to the legitimate in-
terests of Russia, and the apprehension that Yakub Beg, the suc-
cessful rebel and able administrator of Kashgar, would seize this
region also, induced the Russian government in i871 to occupy
Kulja, the capital and fortress of the province. The easy promise
was made to the Chinese that the territory would be returned when
they had re-established their authority beyond the desert, a promise
which the Russians frankly confessed in private they never expected
to make good. When at the end of ten yea s, however, the Chinese
really renewed their hold on the region, Russia good-naturedly re-
signed a land-grab greater in size though of less value than that of
E. G. Ravenstein, The Russians on the Amur, p. 154.
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1861. Her honor was satisfied by an indemnity and a small slice of
territory; but it was not difficuft to understand that her best inter-
ests were served by waiting until the fruit was ripe before the pluck-
ing.
The policy of securing accessions by interference has been most
clearly exhibited in the events of the past few years. China's diffi-
culties have ever been Russia's opportunity, and after so serious a
catastrophe as the war with Japan it was abundahftly evident that
no chances were to be missed in this crisis of her fortunes. The
experience of thirty years in Northeastern Asia had amply proved
the value of Primorskaya and Amur; the practicability of an over-
land rail route from the Baltic to the Pacific had been demonstrated
and the road well begun; a naval base at Vladivostok had been
established. But the rise of Japan as a modern military power and
her ability to close the Sea of Japan in case of hostilities practically
neutralized the importance of this portion of the Pacific coast. The
fact that its harbors were ice-bound during six weeks of the
winter was an additional motive to urge the Russians southward,
but the importance of this factor may easily be exaggerated. Ice
impedes commercial rather than military operations on the sea.
Vladivostok being essentially a strategic base, not a port for traffic,
could always be kept open for the entrance of ironclads in case of
pressing necessity; nor do its masters greatly object to climatic
conditions which are more likely to harass the offensive than the
defensive in a campaign in those waters.
Japan's triumph as formulated in the treaty of Shimonoseki was
therefore doubly objectionable to Russia; it not only increased the
power of a prospective rival who could blockade Vladivostok, but
by ceding Liautung promentory it placed him on both sides of
Korea and within striking distance of every harbor on the seaboard,
of Northern China. If the Czar had any hope of withdrawing his
Pacific stronghold beyond the clutches both of an Arctic winter and
an eager rival he was hereby checkmated in a single move. His
success in this predicament shows extraordinary accuracy in calcu-
lating the forces arrayed against him and sufficiently establishes his
position as arbiter of the affairs of Eastern Asia. A threat of war
at this juncture would have been, if not impracticable, at least highly
impolitic; for Japan would not improbably have accepted a con-
flict, and with her forces already on the field and confident of the
sympathy and suppQrt of Great Britain she could hardly have been
defeated without an exhausting struggle. Until her trans-Siberian
railroad is completed and the provinces beyond Baikal become in
some degree self-supporting, Russia is no condition to meet a
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first-class power on the Pacific. There remained, however, the re-
sources of diplomacy. An appeal to the selfishness and land-hunger
of the European powers brought France and Germany to her side.
A promise to allot'them remunerative shares in the division of China
satisfied them of the danger to humanity and the cause of civiliza-
tion in allowing Japan to retain Liautung. So the island empire
withdrew before this imposing force majeur, and since the ratifica-
tion of that compact Germany has possessed herself of Kiao chau
with the usufruct of Shantung province as a Hinterland, while
France has obtained concessions scarcely less profitabe in the rich
province of Yunnan.
The imminent danger from Japan being removed, it was now
necessary for Russia to reap the rewards not alone of her diplomatic
success, but of many years of preparation and delay beyond the
Amur. It seems probable-but upon such matters the historian
can only speculate for the present-that down to the year 1895
Russia's objective was Korea; that her policy had been directed
toward securing from China her suzerain rights over that nominal
dependency; and that here she proposed to locate fortifications and
garrisons connected by rail with her Siberian system, which would
render her irresistible in the East. China's utter prostration after
defeat made it possible to amend this programme and establish Port
Arthur as a strategic base whence could be controlled not only the
sea route to Peking, but the whole Yellow Sea. The cession of this
highly important place, already equipped with shops, docks and
fortifications, was made by the abject mandarins, nominally as a
lease, embracing exclusive rights overLiautung promentory, in 1895.
It was a brilliant and striking diplomatic success, possibly the most
dramatic coup ever effected in modern Asiatic politics. But the real
crisis of this long adventure, the culmination of which renders the
Port Arthur triumph a mere corollary, had ere this been quietly and
completely attained. For Russia has never willingly departed from
her policy of continuous expansion over territories contiguous to
her own, and the motives that impelled her to transfer Alaska to
the United States would not admit her establishment in an isolated
peninsula on the Korean Bay.
In the abduction of Manchuria from Chinese control Russia ap-
plied for her own purposes some features of that Hinterland doctrine
which has recently been developed by Europe and Africa. On the
principle that the region back of her coast province as far as the
Desert of Gobi was a Hinterland, she could claim the land stretch-
ing from the Amur to the Yellow Sea and thereby complete the
project long entertained of advancing her frontier to march with
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that to China proper. Such a step would make her not only the
master of a rich and habitable country, but would render her prac-
tically indifferent to the control of Korea, since her possessions
would now stretch northward of that peninsula in an unbroken line
to the sea. If within the past year she has resigned to Japan her
pretentions to manage the affairs of that little kingdom her absten-
tion need not be attributed to compunction or confession of error;
it is enough that she has found something better suited to her grand
aims. A delicate feature in taking over Manchuria, however, lay in
the fact that this territory, so far from being a mere appendage of
the empire, was peculiarly dear to the ruling dynasty-as being the
ancient home of the clan, and thereby for sentimental reasons highly
cherished by the Emperor's kin. To obviate the dangers involved
in the application of military pressure upon the court at Peking it
was asked to guarantee Russia the exclusive rights to build a system
of railroads across Manchuria connecting her Siberian line with
Vladivostok and Liautung promentory; to operate and guard this
system with Russian servants and troops-the latter to be garri-
soned in each station along the route ;-to exploit the mines and
forests of the territory; and to settle her colonists there so long as
she remained care-taker on the premises. The proviso that China
may assume control of these roads and mines at the end of eighty
years upon payment of an indemnity over and above their alleged
value at that time is, under the circumstances, hardly worth consid-
eration as a serious document.
All that concerns the present inquiry is the actual, not the theo-
retical situation of Russia as affected by this move. It places her
in military and fiscal control of the Tung-san-sh~ng or "three
eastern provinces," to which collectively the name Manchuria has
been applied by foreigners. The area of this region is roughly esti-
mated at about 275,000 stuare miles, about as much again as Russia
secured by the cessions of 1858-61. Its value, however, is consider-
ably greater, not only because of its command of the metropolitan
province of Chihli, but also on account of a superior sub-Arctic
climate, great fertility, extensive forests, and a population, nineteen-
twentieths pure Chinese, reckoned at 25,oooooo. The ancient
Tartar bands who formerly roamed over the country have recently
been absorbed in the flood of Chinese immigrants whom the Tai-
ping rebellion, two wide-spread famines and the great Yellow River
inundation have driven from Northern China to find homes in this
remote but not uncongenial solitude. A population made up of
such elements as thrive best in frontier settlements has precisely
the rough vigor and adaptability likely to suit the purposes of Rus-
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sian.policy. Colonists like these may be expected to take as kindly
to Western methods and inventions as do the Chinese in the Straits
Settlements, America, and elsewhere, nor will Russia with such a
labor supply be thwarted and delayed in the execution of her pro-
jects as has been the case in unpopulous Siberia. The railway sys-
tem, abandoning the old caravan route across the Mongolian steppe
between Kialhta and Kalgan, is intended to leave the main Siberian
line considerably east of Lake Baikal at Nerchinsk or Stretinsk, and
by keeping well within the wooded and watered districts of Tsitsi-
har and Kirin supply a commercial artery as well as a strategic road
to this promising land. Here, then, are the indispensable requisites
to permanent control in Northeastern Asia already well within Rus-
sian hands: fortified arsenals on the Pacific and Yellow Sea coasts,
through rail connections with the capital and seat of empire, a lit-
toral region sufficiently rich and large to support an army of de-
fense without the necessity of transporting troops across a conti-
nent, and finally the natural products, such as coal and iron, and
provisions, that may be counted on to supply raw material for the
ships and guns of a navy as well as an army.
With nations as with individuals rapid and severe exertion, no
matter how gratifying its result, must be followed by rest. Though
the victor in the games bear away the prize, he may not safely at-
tempt another encounter until he is allowed a little space for re-
cuperation. Russia at present has need of time for assimilating her
newly-won territory to the system already ordered for the whole
of Siberia, and a conviction of this need palpably inspires her policy
in the railway negotiations still proceeding. The Japanese attack
upon China which precipitated the crisis in Eastern Asia found Rus-
sia-as was perhaps intended-quite unprepared to participate.
Because the trans-Siberian railroad was only half completed she
was powerless to mass troops and stores in the East in quantities
sufficient to dictate to such a sturdy opponent as Japan. That she
succeeded in accomplishing so much under this disadvantage was,
as has been seen, the result rather of brilliant and energetic diplo-
macy based upon intimate knowledge of the various factors and
forces involved than of physical strength. Now that the stake has
been risked and won it is doubly necessary for her to palliate for
the present the irritation of her rivals and secure the future by com-
pleting the requisite railways. Orders to hasten operations on
the main line across the continent have been already carried out
with such effect that the all-rail connection with Vladivogtok which
was at first rather hoped for than expected by the year 1904 is now
confidently promised in 19o2. In Manchuria, however, where
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nothing but preliminary surveys have yet been begun, at least five
or six years must be required to join Port Arthur with the great
network that is to support and include it as an integral part. Until
this junction is effected and some organization introduced into the
region her practical hold upon these new possessions is from a mili-
tary point of view hazardous in the extreme; that it is anything at
all is due not only to the decrepitude of China, but also to the jeal-
ousies and cupidity of Europeans whom she has shrewdly disturbed
and divided to secure her particular end.
Russia's evident intention of treating Manchuria as a portion of
her own territories has been exhibited from the outset by the con-
duct of her officers and agents wherever they go, by the settlement
of Cossacks at numerous posts, and by the exclusion of other for-
eigners from Port Arthur and Talienwan, despite previous declara-
tions of a contrary intention, as soon as her garrisons were fairly
ensconsed there. The inclusion of Niuchwang on the Liau River in
this comprehensive application of the old-fashioned doctrine of
allowing a victor the spoils revealed, however, an impasse which has
threatened the gravest consequences. For Niuchwang (also spelt
New chwang) has long been one of the so-called treaty-ports of
China, to which ports her foreign commerce is restricted and at
which, of course, all foreigners enjoy equal privileges. To elim-
inate one of these from the number of Chinese trading-places, as the
result not of conquest, but of private compact devoting it to the
exclusive benefit of a single foreign power, was an infraction, there-
fore, of the rights of all the others, and the first practical exhibition
of the meaning of the much-mooted "partition of China." It was
fortunate, perhaps, that this demonstration instantly convinced the
nation whose successive diplomatic rebuffs during two years had
been borne with curious passiveness. Great Britain, a little callous
of late to her loss of prestige in Eastern Asia, had no disposition to
endure patiently an assault upon her pocket-book. England and
the United States, as it happens, enjoy seven-eighths of the foreign-
borne trade to this port, which is the entrepot supplying the whole of
Manchuria with whatever it gets from abroad. Its tariff 'revenues
are the main reliance of the administrators of the province, which
under Chinese control has been barely self-supporting. When, con-
sequently, the Russians included the customs and c6mmerce of this
place in their occupation of Manchuria the British awoke with a
start to a sense of the importance of the issue. For the first time in
her long series of aggressions in Eastern Asia, Russia had emerged
beyond the merely potential into the practical subtraction of terri-
tory and markets from the legitimate and vested enjoyment of
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others. It was substantially an act of war committed during a time
of peace. Yet from the standpoint of the economical administrator
the need of Russia was pressing. There are reasons to doubt that
Manchuria can be made profitable until her mines and forests are
reached by modem machines and worked by Western processes, all
of which will require time to establish.
The blunt pretention that the authority of the Czar was para-
mount to that of the Emperor Kwangsii in one of the open Chinese
ports was something that the Asiatic office at St. Petersburg was
hardly as yet in position to make. Its answer, however, to the
timely protest of Great Britain was a deflection of the course of the
Manchurian railway from Kirin to Port Arthur and Talienwan be-
yond reach of Niuchwang, thus denying that city the benefits of
railway communication and creating Talienwan the future entrepot
of the province. Unable to prevent this, the British now undertook
through the agency of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank to com-
plete for China some two hundred and sixty miles of railroad be-
tween Shanhaikwan, the present terminus of the Northern line from
Peking, and Niuchwang, thereby joining the natural emporium of
these northern regions with the projected rail system of China. But
here arose another deadlock and source of irritation acute enough
a few months ago to actually menace war. To secure their loan of
$i1,5oo,ooo capital indispensable for the work proposed, the bank-
ers as is usual demanded a lien on the road; but Russia, determined
that no foreigner shall be allowed any hand in or hold upon Man-
churia, compelled the Peking government to withdraw from the
contract thus concluded. The situation between these two great
powers during the closing months of last year was more serious
than at any time since the Pendjeh incident in 1885; nor is it im-
probable, as already hinted in some journals, that the sudden arming
and array of the British navy last October was inspired not by the
luckless temerity of the Frenchman Marchand at Fashoda, but by
this bullying command of Russia to the Tsung-li yamen. The crisis,
however, passed. There must have been a very madness of vexa-
tion on the part of thousands of officers whose ambition is eating
away their hearts in the dreariness of barrack life throughout the
Russian empire, whose cry is ever "How long, 0 Lord! how long I"
But the risk of all she has won for half a century was much too
great to be faced by the ruler of that empire. Probably noihing
has, to those who understand the Russian soldier, so abundantly
proved the stolid determination of his supreme officers to wait until
the railway system is complete, as their practical surrender to Brit-
ish firmness this winter at Peking.
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The railway from the seaward end of the Great Wall to Niu-
chwang is therefore to be constructed within the sacred precincts
of Russian control by British money and engineers, but as a con-
cession to Russian susceptibilities the five per cent. loan is secured
by a lien on the Imperial railroad in general, not on that part of it
running north of Shanhaikwan. The port on the Liau will be
saved from its threatened commercial ruin by the continued visita-
tion of foreign importers and a chance to share in the rapid transit
system of modern China. Is there any significance in the fact, or
was it mere fortuitous coincidence, that the Czar's rescript propos-
ing a general disarmament of European nations was issued at about
the time that Russia had convinced herself of her inability to take
up a gague of battle when flung at her in the Far East?
As an offset to the advantage secured by Great Britain in en-
forcing her contract rights upon soil claimed for Russia, the latter
power has in another region scored a success against her adversary-
in-chief of somewhat the same sort. The southern end of the little
stretch of railways already running in Chihli province terminates at
present at Paotingfu, from which point it is designed to continue
the road across the fertile and populous Yellow River valley to
Hankow,'a distance of some 65o miles. The "Lu-Han," a name
derived by combining the initial syllables of its termini Lu-ku chiao,
the Peking station, and Hankow on the Yangtsz', is a road which
has already served to illustrate the precarious nature of such under-
takings in decadent China. Its desirability as a trunk line connect-
ing the northern and southern groups of provinces was long ago
recognized and its construction ordered by Imperial edict. But the
proviso that it should be built with Chinese capital, of Chinese
material and by Chinese workmen rendered its realization actually
impossible. No Chinaman would trust the official guarantee. After
the disastrous war with Japan a livelier sense of its necessity moved
the government to promise entire immunity from official interfer-
ence if the "rich mcrchants" of the provinces would finance the
affair and hire engineers wherever they could. Still the native capi-
talists distrusted their own mandarins, and the project hung fire.
When Shng was appointed Director General of Railways two years
ago he negotiated with a nurfiber of foreign syndicates-sometimes,
it is said, with all of the applicants at once-in hopes that in the
eagerness of their competition China might secure her great im-
provement at less than cost. But here again the best laid schemes
failed because of the fatal doubt in the integrity of mere promises
and paper pledges from the Chinese authorities. What reliance
upon such endorsement would mean to the investor was rather
317
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amusingly illustrated when it was suggested that the road might be
built piecemeal out of the profits accruing from the road in opera-
tion between Tientsin and Shanhaikwan, the success of which was
already considerable. The moment this plan was explained to the
officials whose pockets had received a regular and handsome per-
centage of these dividends the profits shrank into nothingness and
the government was once more compelled to rely upon foreign
assisfance. This came finally in the shape of the Russo-Chinese
Bank, an arm of the Russian government created for the purpose
of building the Manchurian railways, which on security of the road
itself has already built and is now running the line from Peking to
Paotingfu. Beyond this point it is backing the Belgian syndicate
and thereby securing the same substantial privileges under a mask,
so that the prospect is not uncertain of a trunk line between Peking
and the Yangtsz' managed and practically owned in perpetuity by
the Russian Empire.
It would be impossible within the limits of a sketch which is
concerned only with the attitude of Russia toward China to describe
the plans and prospects of other European nations in this competi-
tion for railroads. Such a conquest by economic instruments in-
stead of by armed men of a magnificent and productive territory
hitherto untouched by the appliances of modern industrial mechan-
ism is of itself unique and interesting. Were the competition con-
fined to the Western European nations the results of their rivalries
might be contemplated with composure on the part of China, who
would in the end reap the benefits of this long delayed transforma-
tion of her economic life. The situation assumes a very serious
aspect, however, when it is remembered that the plans of Russia do
not involve primarily the exploitation and improvement of a back-
ward country. If the lesson of her past career in Asia teaches us
anything it shows an advance undertaken from the outset for pur-
poses of conquest and permanent control. To her the descent from
the Mongolian steppe into populous China means the commence-
ment of the last great act in the long drama of her absorption of
Asia, the acquisition of the richest and most important region of
its size, perhaps, in the inhabited globe. Once fairly within her
grasp, deeply involved in financial obligations to the foreigner, its
main arteries of traffic built and run by Muscovite officials, its sta-
tions in possession of Cossack guards, its mines producing coal and
metals for Russian armaments, its troops drilled by and obedient to
Russian officers, this ancient empire will under its imbecile rulers
surely succumb to the doom so long withheld. When Russia is
fully possessed of the enormous resources and the plentiful popula-
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tion of China she has only to set her mighty army of farmers and
artizans and miners as well as of fighting men in order to dictate
her will to the world. With this result achieved Constantinople,
the object of her earlier ambition, will fall of itself into her lap; and
when the Ottoman has returned at last into the obscurity from
whence he emerged in the thirteenth century, decrepit Iran may fol-
low in his footsteps and the entire continent of Asia north of the
Himalayas become a breeding-place for Russian soldiers, the ex-
clusive dominion of the greatest monopoly ever seen. And when
finally the genius arises who can move this mighty mass by the old
magic of victory to follow him as once they followed Jenghiz Khan
or Tamerlane, what human strength can resist him?
This, perhaps, is the Yellow Peril, of which we hear-a little
scoffingly indeed, because the yellow man at present is apparently
the most impotent and insignificant factor in the political problem.
But the yellow man with his indomitable industry and his magnifi-
cent domain is still there, only awaiting leadership. And the Slav
is ready, with his long experience among Asiatics, his adaptability
to their methods and ideals, his" definite desire for empire and auto-
cratic rule, to lead as fast and as far as he will follow. There is no
pretense here of the education and development of a backward civ-
ilization by more progressive Europe; no cant of Christianity
preached to unregenerate heathen nor the supplanting of Oriental-
materialism by a higher spiritual message. It is the old East in-
carnate, arrayed in the panoply of modem science and invention,
instructed and once more unified, as in the days of ancient Persia,
under Aryan leadership, ready for a renewal of the eternal struggle
with the liberty and enlightenment of the West.
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